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DECISION SUPPORT IN SUPERVISORY CONTROL
Jens Rasmussen and L. P. Goodstein
Abstract.  It is argued that the supervisory control of complex industrial
processes having a potential for serious consequences in case of accidents
requires careful consideration of the allocation of decision making between
the three main agents of control; namely the designer, the operator and the
automatic control system.  In particular, it is advocated that instead of con-
tinuing their efforts to make their preplanning of responses and counter-
measures more and more complete and restricting the operators' initiative,
designers should take advantage of modern information technology to make
available to the operators their conceptual models and their processing re-
sources so as to allow the operators to function as their extended arm in
coping with the plant.  Such an interactive decision making activity would
thus benefit from this simultaneous availability of the design basis, up-to-
date knowledge of plant status and accumulated operational experience.
INIS descriptors: DECISION MAKING; DISPLAY DEVICES; FUNCTIONAL
ANALYSIS; HUMAN FACTORS; INDUSTRIAL PLANTS; MAN-MACHINE
SYSTEMS; MONITORING; SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS
August 1985
Riso National Laboratoty, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark
ISBN 87-550-1149-7
ISSN 0418-6435
Riso repro 1985
LIST OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 1
DECISION MAKING............................................................... 1
COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING ...................................... 3
HIERARCHICAL DECISION SPACE ....................................... 5
CONTENT OF DESIGNER-OPERATOR COMMUNICATION ..... 7
INTERACTIVE DECISION MAKING ...................................... 12
CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 14
REFERENCES..................................................................... 15
INTRODUCTION
The context of this paper is automated industrial processes and the re-
quirements they place for providing adequate and timely support to the oper-
ating staff in connection with the tasks commonly associated with the "job" of
supervisory control.  The operators usually have little or no manual control
activities.  Thus what traditionally is called "hands-on process feel" cannot
play any important role and reliance must therefore be placed on the infor-
mation and manipulation facilities provided by the display and controls in-
terface to provide what the operators need to know and do in order to ensure
that the system operates reliably, economically and safely in the face of devia-
tions from "normal" because of disturbances, technical faults and/or inappro-
priate human actions.
In effect, the crew is part of a decision-making team who, in accordance
with the functional allocations of the designers, play certain assigned roles in
dealing with the process.  Use of the word team reflects the fact that the su-
pervisory control of such complex systems is actually a cooperative effort
within EL team, consisting of the designers, the automatic (computerbased)
control system and,the operating staff.  This three-way arrangement arises
from the fact that the decisions of' the designers are embedded in the auto-
matic system as well as the training of the operators.  Thus the prerequisite
for a successful cooperation is that the computer and the operators/users
have to be able to work together in a positive way by taking advantage of t heir
different and complementary information processing abilities and their differ-
ent knowledge about the system, the environment, the goals, etc.  This means
that the framework in which this cooperation takes place will/should involve
a dynamic allocation of decision functions between the partners with appro-
priate feedback and communication facilities between them.  Thus a crucial
issue revolves around operator acceptance of such a partnership relation-
ship.
DECISION MAKING
Fig. 1 - taken from earlier work (Rasmussen 1976) - describes a framework
which encompasses the various types of information processing sequences
that characterize a decision maker's (dm human or computer) activities in
dealing with a problem.  These include the completely rational approach
where the dm "climbs up the ladder" on the left hand side while observing,
making an identification of state, interpreting the implications and priori-
tizing goals.  Thereafter the dm "climbs down the ladder" on the right hand
2side in connection with planning and carrying out the appropriate set of ac-
tions in order to achieve or reach the chosen target state.
Figure 1. Schematic map of the sequences of information processes involved in a control de-
cision.  Rational, causal reasoning connects the "states of knowledge" in the basic sequence.
Stereotyped processes can by-pass intermediate stages.  Adopted from Rasmussen, 1976.
The diagram indicates as well alternate paths from the initiation of a deci-
sion making activity to its conclusion.  For example, in situations which seem
to be familiar to the dm, shortcut paths can exist in the form of a large num-
ber of association rules - e.g. IF xx, DO yy.  It is these which form the basis
for the veteran or experienced dmls behaviour in dealing with the object sys-
tem and often comprise the expert knowledge which is acquired for building
current expert systems.
Thus while in the real world the rational type of decision making behaviour
is probably mostly restricted to novices feeling their way, much can be said for
3forcing experienced users to resort more to this type of response through a
suitabl@, designed display and controls interface.  The reason for this i.s of
course that the repertoire of quick and effective responses is not all-inclusive
for every possible situation.  Thus, in their interaction with the system, op-
erators first have to be made to realize the inherent risk i.n a hasty response
and thereafter be supported in more of a goal-directed decision making se-
quence in order to solve their current problem.
COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING
As stated earlier, decision making in supervisory control is a shared enter-
prise comprising the designer, the automatic computerized system and the
staff of operators/users.  Since the designer will not be able to foresee the
necessary control responses for all possible disturbances, he needs a repre-
sentative on site - the operators - who have to be able to take over in at com-
petent way.  The operators' supervisory control task is indeed in many re-
spects a completion of the system design for the particular, perhaps infre-
quent, situation being dealt with.  As a consequence, the operator will need
information about the problem space underlying the design and the designer
will have to communicate this kind of information to the operator.  This can
take place through the system itself; i.e., by means of the information gath-
ered, processed and stored in the computer-based instrumentation and/or
directly through training, manuals and instructions. The cooperative decision
making among operator, designer and computer will result in a complex
communication depending on the extent to which the designer want his rep-
resentatives on site to take an active part.
Fig. 2a and b illustrate how the basic framework of Fig. 1 can be replicated
to reflect how a designer might intend two typical situations to be allocated
among the partners.  At the same time, the diagrams indicate the various
classes of communication among them.  See also Rasmussen (1984a) and
Sheridan (1982).  An identification of such classes can be useful in-deciding
on appropriate information display support.
4Figure 2A.  The designer, the operator, and the process computer are all parts of a control
decision.  The figure illustrates their roles (shown hatch6d) in an automatic safety shut-
down, in which they act "in parallel"; each with a diagnostic task based on different strate-
gies.
Figure 2B.  The figure illustrates the roles of the designer, the operator, and a computer in
a control decision which has not been fully automated, i.e. the operator and computer act "in
series".  The designer has automated a. repertoire of protective sequences, but left the diag-
nosis to an operator.  In addition to the decision functions, the designer, operator and com-
puter support each other in different inform/teach/learn functions, Sheridan, -1982-'
5Figure 3. The system properties considered in man-machine interaction can be described at
various levels of abstraction, representing the physical implementation and functional pur-
pose in varying degrees.
HIERARCHICAL DECISION SPACE
Another important consideration is the decision context, the representation
of the problem space.  Rasmussen (1984a) has dealt with this in detail in his
description of the different levels of abstraction and decomposition which a
human may use to cope with the complexity of a technical system, depending
upon the situation and the phase of a decision task.
In the abstraction, or me-ans-end, hierarchy (see Fig. 3), the low levels of
abstraction are related to the available set of physical equipment which can
be used to serve several different purposes.  Models at higher levels of ab-
straction are closely related to specific purposes, each of which can be served
by different physical arrangements.  This hierarchy is therefore useful for a
6systematic representation of the many-to-many mappings in the purpose /
function / equipment relationships which represent the context of - and a
necessary precondition for supervisory decision making.  Considering a con-
trol task at any level of the hierarchy, information about the proper function,
target states, and answers to the question WHY, is obtained from the level
above, while information about present limitations and available resources,
i.e. answers to the question HOW, can be gotten from the level below (Ras-
mussen, 1984a).
In the present context, we are in particular interested in those human
functions in man-machine systems which are related to corrections of the ef-
fects of faults and. other disturbances.  States can only be defined as distur-
bances or faults with reference to the planned or intended functions and pur-
poses.  Causes of improper functions depend on changes in the physical
world.  Thus they are propagating - and explained - bottom-up in the hierar-
chy.  In contrast, reasons for proper functions are derived top-down in the hi-
erarchy from the functional purpose.
During plant operation, the task of the supervisory controller man and/or
machine - will be, by means of proper actions on the system, to ensure that
the actual state of the system matches the target state specified from the in-
tended mode of operation. This task can be formulated at any level in the
means-ends hierarchy. During plant start-up, for instance, the task moves
bottom-up through the hierarchy.  In order to have an orderly synthesis of the
overall plant function during start-up, it is necessary to establish a number of
autonomous functional units at one level before they can be connected to one
function at the next higher level.  This definition of functional units at several
levels is likewise important for establishing orderly separation of functional
units for shut-down and for reconfiguration during periods of malfunction.
During emergencies and major disturbances, an important supervisory
control decision is the selection of the level of abstraction at which to consider
the control task.  In general, highest priority will be related to the highest level
of abstraction: First consider overall consequences for plant production and
safety in order to judge whether the plant mode of operation should be
switched to a safer state (e.g. stand-by or emergency shut-down).  Next, con-
sider whether the situation can be counteracted by reconfiguration of func-
tions and physical resources.  This is a judgement at a lower level represent-
ing functions and equipment.  Finally, the root causes of the disturbance are
sought to determine how it should be corrected.  This involves the level of
physical functioning of parts and components.  Generally, this search for the
physical disturbance is of lowest priority (not considering the role which
knowledge about the physical cause may have for the understanding of the
situation).
7Thus, when a disturbance has been identified and the control task located
at a certain level of abstraction, depending upon the perceived situation, the
supervisory control task includes the determination of the target state derived
top-down from the operation mode chosen, and an identification of the avail-
able functional resources and' limits of capabilities, established bottom-up in
the hierarchy.
All of this has serious implications for the design itself as well. as the de-
termination of the knowledge required by the operators.  In practice, system
design based on proven technology is largely an updating of previous designs
with little specific attention being paid to a thorough task analysis and/or
other special operator needs.  However, a formal design and/or one based on
new technology such as advanced computer-based techniques, requires a
continuous iteration between considerations of purposes, functions and
equipment in the means-end hierarchy (Rasmussen and Lind, 1981) - also as
the basis for defining the information to be made available to the operators to
support their allocated supervisory roles.
CONTENT OF DESIGNER-OPERATOR COMMUNICATION
The content of information to be communicated to the operating staff dur-
ing a particular abnormal situation depends on the role allocation chosen by
the designer for himself, the operator and the computer.  It depends as well
on the extent to which he is able to foresee the situation and make a detailed
analysis, the result of which he wants the operators to consider.
Before such complex examples of cooperative decision making are consid-
ered, it is relevant' to discuss the information which is needed by the operat-
ing staff if they have to cope with situations which have not been analysed by
the designer.  This is an important case, since this information will also be
needed in other situations for which operating instructions are available, in
order to understand the responses of the system to a. degree which enable the
operators to detect and respond intelligently to the effects of their own - often
unforeseen - errors.  Studies have shown that the information needed to con-
trol execution of pre-established procedures is typically not adequate for error
detection and recovery (Rasmussen, 1984b).
The basic content of the information about the design basis which is neces-
sary to enable operators to consider the whole supervisory decision sequence
can be identified from the abstraction hierarchy:
An important basis for prediction of responses of the system to control in-
puts in supervisory control decisions is knowledge about functional relations
at each of the levels in the hierarchy.  This includes knowledge of plant anat-
omy and spatial arrangements at the lowest level of physical form.  At the
8level of physical function, important information is the description of the
functioning of equipment, for instance, in the form of pressure-flow-rpm
charts for pumps, reactivity-power equations for nuclear reactor cores, etc.
Possibilities at the level of more generic functions are phase plots for water-
steam systems ("steam tables"), heat transfer characteristics of cooling cir-
cuits and control strategies for automatic controllers.  More general charac-
teristics in terms of power and inventory balances will be typical for more ab-
stract functional requirements.  Finally, at the level of functional purpose, the
production requirements and the specifications of risk targets and limits for
dangerous releases are given.
This kind of information, describing relationships within each level of the
hierarchy, can be stated in rather neutral, or objective terms, and will in gen-
eral be immediately accessible in engineering manuals and system descrip-
tions.  Such information as well as descriptions of the functional mapping
upwards in the hierarchy is typically related to established and well docu-
mented methods for engineering analysis.  This is not the case for information
describing the downward mapping which represents the design decisions; i.e.,
the reasons behind the chosen implementations.  This information is typically
implicitly found in company or engineering practices or is based on the de-
signer's personal preferences and seldom finds its way to the operators.  This
may be crucial for control decisions when overruling of a design requirement,
e.g., an interlock protection, has to be considered during critical. situations.
Traditionally, much effort is spent in presenting operators with analytical,
bottom-up information about the system.  Only little attention has been paid
to the need for top-down, intentional information on reasons for the design.
To give access to such information, ad-hoc advice facilities are typically estab-
lished in the form of technical supervisors on call and - in the nuclear indus-
try - "resident technical advisors" and "technical support centers".  This kind
of information should be directly available to the operating staff, probably in a
kind of "expert system" computer- based tutoring system.
The lack of information on reasons may not be a problem in systems of
moderate size and risk levels, for which only the rather frequent operational
states have to be considered since the reasons for these will be immediately
and empirically known to the operating staff, since their effects are frequently
met.  This is not the case for large system s where safety specifications also
have to consider rare events.  In such systems, reasons for infrequent yet im-
portant functions may be much more obscure to operators and special means
may be required to make them understood.  The information can be objec-
tively stated, but it may be difficult to collect, once the design has been com-
pleted.  It is a frequent experience for operating organisations that questions
to system suppliers concerning their design bases are hard to have answered;
typically, minutes from project meetings have to be retrieved since the man in
9possession of the knowledge has moved to another position.  Information rep-
resenting reasons for design choices, for production and safety policies in a
company will have the character of heuristic rules which are verbally stated,
and an information base in the form of an "expert system" and an "expert
knowledge acquisition" program to collect such information may be a useful
tool for alleviating these difficulties.
Communication of what could be called neutral information related only to
the background for decision making - information which describes functional
properties of the system and specifies the intended operating states without
trying to guide the decisions of the operators can be considered an objective of
teaching.  There will in general be no role ambiguity between the communi-
cating partners.
This is not the case when the system designer attempts directly to support
the decision process of the operators.  In high risk installations, designers will
analyse large sets of abnormal events to judge the adequacy of the design and
to preplan the necessary supervisory control actions.  Some of these may be
automated, some left to the operating staff as instructions, and the communi-
cation viill no longer be the transmission of neutral objective facts to the op-
erators.  Communication is now between partners sharing the information
processing tasks of the decision ladder, and communication modes may in-
clude the total range from neutral messages, to advice, recommendations, and
instructions and perhaps to direct orders.  Information will not only aim by its
content towards a proper control action but also, implicitly via its form, to-
wards allocation of authority and responsibility.
Different communication situations appear depending on the mode of coop-
eration chosen for the partners.  Criteria for the role allocation may be related
to reliability requirements, to the resources and conceptual model available to
support the processing by the different agents, or to the actual system state
data accessible to them.  The respective role allocations may be that the de-
signer chooses to automate certain protective functions and thereby take over
one of the supervisory sub-goals; that he chooses to preanalyse certain
phases of the decision sequence through use of his analytical models and is-
sue instructions to the operators; or, finally, that lack of data leads him to
transfer his conceptual tools to the operators in the form of facilities for inter-
active decision making.  These modes of role allocation will be considered in
more detail to formulate the communication requirements between designer
and operator.
Allocation of different sub-goals.  For large industrial installations, there
are some abnormal situations when necessary reaction times are so short or
consequences so large that control cannot be left to the care of humans.  The
designer then analyses a representative set of scenarios involving events for
which a defining set of attributes in terms of magnitude of measured variables
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can be found, together with a reliable sequence of control actions, such as
safety shut-down.  This control sequence can be executed automatically, or
operators can be ordered to follow emergency procedures strictly.
Formally, the designer and the operators will have to pursue different sub-
goals.  The designer takes on the task and responsibility to protect the plant
by automatic protection, while the operators are typically given an early
warning that automatic actions may come up, and are left with the supervi-
sory control task of maintaining operation but within the envelope of the
automatic protection.  In this case, the designer and operators are cooperating
by pursuing separate sub-goals, and responsibility as well as competence are
clearly defined.  The designer and the operator will be processing in separate
decision ladders, and communication of data or results for each other's deci-
sion making will not be needed.
In most cases, however, the designer will not be completely confident about
his automatic system, and operators will be instructed to monitor that safety
actions are executed properly, and to intervene if this is not the case.  They
are here cooperating intimately with the designer in one single decision task,
and will need the whole decision background including reasons for design of
the protection system in order to judge properly when to override. (Mistaken
overruling of automatic safety actions is one of the major prediction problems
in safety assessments.) In this way, a role allocation which formally and in
principle is quite clear and only requires simple designeroperator communi-
cation at a closer look will require intimate cooperation in practice because
the designer will not be confident that the results of @,is situation analysis
which he has stored in the automatic system are reliable.
Allocation of different sub-tasks.  A similar situation is found when the
designer finds that certain phases of the decision sequence demand concep-
tual models and processing resources which can not be assumed to be avail-
able to operators during disturbed situations.  A typical example is the plan-
ning of the reconfiguration of the plant to cope with major faults.  The de-
signer will then define a number of typical events, in terms of for instance
small/large steam tube breaks, or small/large loss-of-coolant accidents.  He
will analyse the proper countermeasures and issue instructions labelled by
the event categories.  The diagnostic part of the decision will typically be left
to the operating team due to the variability in symptom patterns.
In this case, the designer and operator will be cooperating by sharing a task
and, in turn, take care of different subroutines in the decision process.  This
switching will take place at the standard key nodes of the sequence and will
imply exchange of intermediate results.  Operators are in charge of the diag-
nostic subroutine, while goal priority and plans for action are retrieved from a
data base, supplied by the designer.  The role allocation in this situation is far
from clear.  If operators are asked to follow the operating instructions strictly;
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i.e., they are interpreted as orders, the function will be unreliable in practice.
Events are much more varied than the stereotype categories the designer can
consider, and the resources available for countermeasures depend on mainte-
nance schedules and errors during repair, etc.  In effect, then, it should be re-
alised that instructions are to be considered as recommended practice which
should only be used by operators as a basis for adaptation to the specifics of
the occurrence.
Again, the designer and the operator will have to cooperate within one sub-
routine of the decision sequence and, in addition to communication of the re-
sult of the data processing, the operator will. need information about the as-
sumptions and preconditions of the designer's analysis; i.e., not only bottom-
up causal data but also top-down specification of reasons, in order to have
the necessary reference for judging the adequacy of i- 'he existing procedure
and the acceptability of his modifications.  To consider an operator only as an
agent for executing designer's preplanned actions will be unreliable.  Instead,
he should be considered to be the designer's representative on site, and the
role allocation to consider is that of cooperative decision making.
At present, there seem to be two lines of development. one is a continuation
of the tradition of the less resourceful technology by storing the results of the
designer's analysis in automated sequential control actions.  After Three-Mile-
Island, for instance, there has been a tendency to advocate "symptom-based"
procedures instead of "event-based".  This means that the diagnostic se-
quence also has been analysed by the designer and the results stored in the
system as kind of "naturalist field guide" to carry the operators through the
diagnosis in a purely rule-based fashion.  Similarly, it has been proposed to
use the results of fault tree analyses from probabilistic risk assessments to
develop "alarm analysis" offering advice to operators during disturbances from
stored computer decision tables.  Both of these approaches run the risk of
giving trivial answers in frequent situations and wrong answers in rare events
- and therefore can lead to a loss of operators, confidence.  A fundamental de-
sign principle ought to be that consistent on-line engineering analysis is used
as far as possible, and that heuristics and hypothetical foresight are only ap-
plied to supplement such analysis or to guide the order in which analyses are
performed.
The other line of development - and that advocated here - is to realise that
the modern information technology gives the designer the facilities to place his
conceptual models and processing resources at the service of operators,
rather than to continue the efforts to make the preplanning of countermea-
sures more and more complete.
Thus what is advocated here is a kind of interactive decision making where
designers and operators are mutually able to bring their own and their part-
ner's advantages into play.  The designer will transfer his conceptual models
12
to the operator in terms of an explicitly represented abstraction hierarchy to-
gether with his processing models for integrating measured information to
match the requirements at the different levels of the problem space.  At the
same time, the operator will be able to use up-to-date state information and
his knowledge about ongoing maintenance work and all the accumulated ex-
perience with developing operating practice.
INTERACTIVE DECISION MAKING
The design philosophy where the designer is trying to communicate his
conceptual models and processing resources rather than his own analysis of
the actual state will be discussed with reference to Fig. 4. The figure reflects
the close relationship between the decision process modelled by the decision
ladder and the means-end hierarchy.  During diagnosis via the analytical leg
of the ladder, the task is to identify the state of affairs at the functional level
which enables judgements of the operational consequences.  In the abstrac-
tion hierarchy, this corresponds to a bottom-up determination of the propa-
gation of the disturbance and requires an integration of measured physical
data into higher level states.  When these actual states have been judged with
reference to goals, planning of control actions is based on a top-down identifi-
cation of the functions needed and of the available equipment.  The decision
ladder structures the process into standardised elements which define key
nodes in terms of states of knowledge which are suited for communication
and transfer of processing between partners.  The abstraction (meansends)
hierarchy is well suited to identify the knowledge needed for the information
processing.
Fig. 4 illustrates how the computer and the operators cooperate on the
(upward) analytical diagnostic leg of the decision ladder as well as on the
(downward) planning leg.  The basic role allocation is that the operator and
designer interact intimately during the different phases of the decision se-
quence.  Instead of communicating results of analyses based on hypothetical
data, the designer brings his conceptual tools into operation "on site" through
the computer.  The computer has the capacity and accuracy necessary to test
consistency of sensor data, to check correspondence with component charac-
teristics and basic physical relationships (e.g. "steam tables"), and to take ac-
count of mass and energy balances.  In addition, analyses of the data col-
lected during routine operations can be used for defining "normal states" of
the various functional levels for the different operating regimes to serve as ref-
erence for locating disturbances in the functional topography.  In this way,
the computer will be able to interrelate actual states and target states up
through the hierarchy.  Ir fact, it thereby performs a diagnosis in terms of lo-
cation of disturbances in the functional topologies without being dependent
upon the designer's foresight.  The results can be displayed as neutral state-
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ments of z,elationships up through the hierarchy without recommendations of
actions or priorities.  It will be important to present results from such key
nodes in the analysis and to select content and form of displays which allow
operators to make crosschecks with their own judgement, to relate to their
empirical symptomatic data and to check hypotheses from such sources.  The
choice of priorities in goals will be left to operators depending on their percep-
tion of policies and available resources.  In such a system, the mental load
from data integration will be diminished but at the price of the extra task of
retrieving the proper display or asking the proper question to the data base.
Signals calling the attention to the functional domain where changes have
been identified by the computer (functional alarming, Goodstein, 1985) may
be an efficient retrieval support instead of serving as an advice for action as
the intention is for traditional alarm systems.
Figure 4. Schematic representation of computer support for interactive decision making.  The
decision ladder of figure I is illustrating a decision sequence which is based on elementary
observations.  For interactive decision making where information is available directly at the
relevant levels of abstraction, the lower stages are only occasionally used.  This is illustrated
by embedding the ladder in the abstraction hierarchy.  Conscious decision making takes
place directly at the relevant level which is interfaced to the environment by direct perception
and sensori-motor skills and/or computer based data integration and planning.  In addition,
computer support of the central decision process may be used.  The analytical identification
and planning between levels may be optional for cross checks by operators.
Judgement of resources is included in the activities in the downward plan-
ning leg of the decision sequence.  Again, the communication from the de-
signer should be based on a consistent engineering analysis of intended func-
tions and on tools for online analyses of the available physical resources
rather than hypothetical analyses of abnormal states.  Frequently, several
physically possible solutions may be available, and the choice will be depend-
ent upon economic or maintenance experience.  For support of such priori-
tisi'ng, an "expert system" structure may be useful for the operating staff for
recording overall plant experience. (Present "expert system" technology proba-
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bly will be more reliable in a planning task for ranking choices than in the di-
agnostic task in process control).
This means that the computer and operators will share the planning func-
tion.  A basic prerequisite for planning will be information on the operational
state and availability of equipment and functions, and computer support will
depend on adequate access to actual configuration data, e.g. actual state of
the valving and switching.  If this is available, the designer will be able to ar-
range displays of the possible configurations of equipment for various func-
tions with indications of availability considering the maintenance states -
"success-paths" (Corcoran, 1981; Long, 1984).  Procedural support for estab-
lishing higher level functions from choice of a proper success path can be
available from a stored library of instructions which will be labelled neutrally
by functions, rather than by events.  For many such functions, automatic se-
quence control can be incorporated if necessary with input of actual condi-
tioning information based on maintenance states from operators.  This leaves
the operator free to express the selected target states at different levels of in-
tegration, depending on conditions, see Fig. 4. Again, information from the
computer is in neutral terms representing engineering analysis of defined
technical functions and not hypothetical situations.
CONCLUSION
The approach to computer support of supervisory decision making advo-
cated in this paper is to consider operators as being capable of taking on the
authority and responsibility for the decisions required.  Rather than continue
a development where designers attempt to preanalyse all abnormal situations
and to store their advice in computers, they should instead try to make avail-
able to operators their conceptual tools and use the capacity of computers to
perform on-line analyses of the available measured data.  Supervisory control
should be based as far as possible on consistent engineering analysis.  Heu-
ristics and hypothetical foresight should be used to supplement such analy-
ses and to guide the priority of choice and not to replace onsite engineering
analyses.  However, real life is not black or white; the real systems will have to
combine all the approaches.  When an information system contains a mixture
of factual information, heuristics and advice based on other people's foresight,
credibility may be a problem.  For the design of decision support systems, we
need design criteria related to users' acceptance of advices and the precondi-
tions for user understanding of arguments.  What are the conditions for hu-
man understanding and acceptance of advice giving?  What constitutes the
basis for cooperative attitudes towards a computer advisor, compared with a
competitive, and distrustful attitude?
15
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